The year 1915 saw Britain face a previously unknown threat: air raids upon its civilian population. The use of aircraft in war was nothing new at this point: hot air balloons had been used for observation and to distribute propaganda as early as the Napoleonic wars, and aeroplanes were involved in the Italo-Turkish war of 1911-12 as a means of bombardment. The First World War saw this technology being used on a much wider scale than ever before, however, and the strategic attack by air of targets away from the main battlefields brought the war home to civilians in an entirely new way.

There were existing fears that German airships might be used to bomb strategic targets before the war had even started. HG Wells had published a novel called The War in the Air in 1908, for example, in which German airships launched a surprise raid against New York. In late 1912 and early 1913, panicked speculation about the potential range and capabilities of German airships led to sightings of apparent craft in the night sky across Britain that weren’t actually there (these were later called phantom airships or ‘scareships’). Observers thought these sightings were the German military testing out British defences in preparation for the next war. That such occurrences happened showed how unsettling the public found the idea of airship attacks.

In the opening months of the war, Liege and Antwerp were both bombed by Zeppelins. It took until 19 January 1915, however, for Kaiser Wilhelm to give the go-ahead for the first raid on Britain. Three craft left Hamburg bound for industrial targets in Humberside, but with one of the airships turning back with mechanical issues and poor weather conditions hindering the remaining two, the target was changed to whatever they could manage to reach rather than what it was strategic to bomb. Their cargo was ultimately unloaded over King’s Lynn and Great Yarmouth in Norfolk, with crew using the lights of buildings and streetlamps on the ground to guide them towards populated areas; they killed four civilians before returning to their base.

On 5 March a raid did manage to reach Hull, with nine civilians perishing; raids also targeted other areas, such as Dover, Ipswich and Southend. The Kaiser continued to resist the bombing of London – due to his unwillingness to damage the cultural heritage of the city and his familial connection to the Royal family – but gave into pressure to do so some weeks later. On 31 May, a single airship appeared over north London, dropping bombs that started 41 fires, killing seven people and injuring another 35; four of the deaths were people aged 16 and under. The Zeppelins quickly became known as ‘baby-killers’.

At the time these raids began, Britain was ill-equipped to deal with this new threat. Traditionally, the sea had protected the country from attack and the coastline was therefore the natural place to concentrate defences; most of the aircraft of the Royal Flying Corps were already based overseas and were unavailable to come to the country’s immediate aid. With outrage and fear growing among the public, action needed to be taken quickly. These feelings were similar to those expressed by Londoners following the 7/7 terrorist attacks, where the suddenness of events and random nature of targets caused shock and anxiety.

Some squadrons were recalled to southern England in a bid to protect against the airships, with incendiary ammunition developed in a bid to more effectively attack the Zeppelins. Anti-aircraft guns, searchlights and a system of observers to watch out for incoming airships over southern and eastern England were also used, with barrage balloons raised above London to force the airships into higher flight from where it was harder to aim bombs. From September 1917, streetlights began to be turned off in London to make navigation harder for enemy aircraft; even the distinctive lake in St James’ park was drained to remove another navigational aid. Londoners took to sheltering in underground stations during air raids, and between May 1917 and May 1918 it is estimated that more than 300,000 people used the Tube in this way.

With this new threat there came a new question – how should authorities alert people to the danger of a potential air raid and let them know when it was safe again? In early July 1917, a novel approach was devised: police officers on foot or bicycles wearing ‘take cover’ notices, blowing whistles and shouting warnings to the public. Upon receiving intelligence from the chain of observers on the coastline and in high places that enemy aircraft were approaching, regular and special constables from stations along the aircraft’s expected flightpath could be sent out in early warning system that the Commissioner of Police hoped “would prove not ineffective” as an emergency measure until something better could be put in place. Those who heard the warnings could then take shelter in underground stations, basements or under railway arches. This was the first air raid early warning system.

By 21 July 1917, a further measure had been added – the release of three ‘sound rockets’ from the tops of London fire stations to indicate the approach of enemy aircraft, which could warn a wider area more quickly than policemen alone could do. This was later reduced to two rockets per station in areas felt to be at risk. Boy Scout buglers were also drafted in later in 1917 as a method of sounding the ‘all clear’ after the raid had finished and civilians could be about their business again. The buglers were posted to police and fire stations, and took to bicycles or were driven by motor cars if available to spread the word. The Liverpool Daily Post of 31 October 1917 recorded that, “the bugles go ranging through the streets sounding the welcome C and G notes, and fall very pleasantly on the ear”.

The effect of air raids on Britain was far more psychological than physical. The raids scared the population, they kept people awake at night and changed the way they behaved; there are some reports that workers at factories were less productive on the day following an air raid, for instance, perhaps due to the distress or lack of sleep caused by bombs falling. One aim of the raids was to try and force sufficient panic in the civilian population to destabilise the government and force Britain out of the war, as it was assumed that people without military training would be unable to cope with the demands of an ongoing aerial bombing campaign.

However, people showed a remarkable ability to adapt to this new stress, and the reaction was less hysterical than it might have been given the experience with phantom airships before the war. After the earliest raids, the Daily Mirror carried the headline: “Every German bomb means another British battalion! The air-huns’ recruiting work on the east coast”, which suggests some sort of early ‘blitz spirit’ forming in the British people. This was possibly because the death toll was lower and the damage less severe than was feared before the war, but also because people began to realise that they now had a home front as well as the battlefront that the armed forces fought on, and that what they did could contribute to victory or defeat.